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Environmental conservation initiatives, includingmarineprotectedareas (MPAs), haveproliferated in recentdecades.
Designed to conserve marine biodiversity, many MPAs also seek to foster sustainable development. As is the case
for many other environmental policies and programs, the impacts of MPAs are poorly understood. Social–ecological
systems, impact evaluation, and common-pool resource governance are three complementary scientific frameworks
for documenting and explaining the ecological and social impacts of conservation interventions. We review key
components of these three frameworks and their implications for the study of conservation policy, program, and
project outcomes. Using MPAs as an illustrative example, we then draw upon these three frameworks to describe
an integrated approach for rigorous empirical documentation and causal explanation of conservation impacts.
This integrated three-framework approach for impact evaluation of governance in social–ecological systems (3FIGS)
accounts for alternative explanations, builds upon and advances social theory, and provides novel policy insights in
ways that no single approach affords. Despite the inherent complexity of social–ecological systems and the difficulty
of causal inference, the 3FIGS approach can dramatically advance our understanding of, and the evidentiary basis
for, effective MPAs and other conservation initiatives.
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Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed rapid growth in the
diversity, abundance, and spatial extent of environ-
mental conservation initiatives designed to conserve
biodiversity and foster sustainable development.1–3
National parks, hunting regulations, endangered
species legislation, pollution control laws, and
other traditional state-centered regulatory poli-
cies have been joined by formal systems of pay-
ments for ecosystem services,4 community-based
management,5,6 environmental certification,7 and
natural resource privatization (e.g., privately pro-
tected areas, conservation easements, and catch
shares).8–10 Despite the growing number and diver-
sity of conservation initiatives, the impacts of these
interventions are often only poorly understood.11,12
Marine protected areas (MPAs), a cornerstone
of global efforts to conserve marine biodiversity
and alleviate coastal poverty, typify the proliferation
of conservation initiatives. Also known as marine
reserves, sanctuaries, managed areas, and parks, an
MPA is “any area of the intertidal or subtidal ter-
rain, together with its overlying water and associ-
ated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features,
which has been reserved by law or other effec-
tive means to protect part or all of the enclosed
environment.”13 The number and spatial extent of
MPAs have increased severalfold since 1990, accel-
erating in recent years, such that more than 12,000
MPAs now cover 8.4% of coastal waters and 3.4%
of the global ocean.14,15 MPAs vary dramatically in
size, regulatory restrictions, governance, and social
and ecological contexts.16–18 MPAs are established
for diverse reasons,19,20 often with multiple and
sometimes conflicting goals: small, locally managed
MPAs are often designed to enhance food security
and manage data-poor fisheries,18 while large “Big
Ocean” MPAs contribute to full representation of
marine habitats and progress toward Convention
on Biological Diversity targets for MPAs to cover
10% of the global ocean by 2020.14,15,21
The ecological impacts of MPAs are highly
variable, ranging from positive to negative.22–24
MPA establishment often increases the density,
biomass, size, and diversity of otherwise-exploited
The copyright line for this article was changed on July 29,
2017 after original online publication.
species within MPA boundaries,23–25 with subse-
quent indirect impacts on other species through
cascading ecological interactions (e.g., parrotfish
increases, macroalgae declines, and subsequent
coral recovery).26–28 Available evidence, although
limited, suggests that MPAs that prohibit fishing
can lead to enhanced ecological resilience, includ-
ing resilience to climate fluctuations,29,30 storm
disturbance,31 and invasive species.32 Correspond-
ing impacts in areas adjacent to MPAs include
increased larval recruitment,33 spillover of adult
fish,34,35 and reduced fear behaviors among fish.36
The wide variation in direction and magnitude of
MPA ecological impacts has been attributed toMPA
governance (e.g., MPA age, size, resource-use rules,
and compliance), management capacity (e.g., staff
and budget),24 biophysical factors (e.g., isolation by
deep water), and species traits (e.g., range or life
history characteristics).37–40 A significant portion
of the variability in ecological outcomes remains
unexplained.23,24,41
The social impacts of MPAs are widely debated
and less well understood than their ecological
analogues.22,42 The intended and unintended social
impacts of MPAs vary across social domains,42,43
spatial and temporal scales,44 and within and
among social groups.42,45 MPA establishment
reallocates property rights46 over marine resources,
thus restructuring relationships among stakehold-
ers and transforming spatial and temporal patterns
of fishing and other activities.47,48 In many cases,
reallocation of MPA resource rights affects multiple
dimensions of human well-being42,49 through pro-
cesses mediated by the characteristics of individual
resource users (e.g., gear type)42,44 and contextual
characteristics (e.g., human population size).50 The
resulting MPA impacts on economic well-being,
cultural identity, and social conflict can be positive,
neutral, or negative (e.g., Refs. 43 and 51–53).
Evidence suggests that MPAs significantly increase
aspects of food security formost fisher subgroups,42
but the long-term implications of MPAs for other
health outcomes remain largely unexplored.54,55
Themagnitude and direction ofMPA social impacts
are frequently dependent on scale, varying at dif-
ferent levels of social organization.44 Social impacts
also vary in their degree of permanence,43 with
some more likely to manifest almost immediately
(e.g., resource rights)47 and others emerging over
longer timescales (e.g., child nutrition).54 MPAs
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frequently confer economic benefits and costs
to those who use MPA resources; these benefits
and costs are often unequally distributed among
individuals, among social groups, and across space
and time.47,56–58 MPA economic benefits may
include increased revenue from nonextractive uses
and the capture of nonuse value (e.g., donations
and user fees).59–62 Conversely, extractive users may
face significant opportunity and financial costs
from MPA establishment.58,63
Scholars and practitioners have proposed diverse
analytic frameworks for monitoring and evaluat-
ing MPAs (e.g., Refs. 64–66) and analogous con-
servation initiatives (e.g., Refs. 67 and 68), but
three distinct approaches have gained currency:
social–ecological systems (SESs), impact evaluation,
and common-pool resource governance.69–71 An
SES is an integrated system characterized by com-
plex, interdependent, and reciprocal relationships
between human society and ecosystems.72 Impact
evaluation, by contrast, is the systematic process of
assessing the causal effects of a project, program, or
policy.73 Common-pool resource governance refers
to the system of decision-making arrangements,
resource-use rights, monitoring and enforcement
systems, and conflict-resolution mechanisms that
shapehuman interactionswith common-poolnatu-
ral resources. To date, the relationships among these
three approaches remain relatively unexplored.
To further scientific efforts to document and
explain variation in the impacts of conservation ini-
tiatives,we review the relationships amongkey com-
ponents of SESs, impact evaluation, and common-
pool resource governance. In particular, we examine
the SES framework for classifying social–ecological
variables, the research design tenets of impact
evaluation, and hypotheses derived from theories
of common-pool resource governance. UsingMPAs
as an illustrative example, we then draw upon
these three approaches to describe an integrated
approach for rigorous empirical documentation
and causal explanation of conservation impacts.
This integrated three-framework approach to impact
evaluation of governance in social–ecological systems
(3FIGS) controls for alternative causal explana-
tions, builds upon and advances social theory, and
provides novel policy insights in ways that no single
approach affords. We conclude with a discussion
of the merits and limits of 3FIGS for evaluation of
MPAs and other conservation interventions.
3FIGS conceptual foundations
Social–ecological systems framework
The SES framework is a hierarchical classification
system that helps to “identify thebasicworkingparts
and critical relationships” that characterize cou-
pled social and ecological systems.74 As part of the
broader literature on SESs,75–77 the SES framework
“facilitate[s] multidisciplinary efforts toward a bet-
ter understanding of complex SESs”78—particularly
those involving common-pool natural resources.74
At its most basic, the SES framework categorizes the
relationships and interactions (Fig. 1; I) among spe-
cific actors (A), governance systems (GS), natural
resource systems (RS), and resource units (RU)—
and the social and ecological outcomes (O) that flow
from these interactions. The interactions among
these four subsystems (A, GS, RS, and RU) and
the outcomes (O) that result from them are the
products of a focal action situation (a situation in
which inputs are transformed by multiple actors
into outcomes);74 these subsystems, interactions,
and outcomes are embeddedwithin a broader social
(S) and ecological context (ECO) that may shape—
andbe shapedby—theSESs.78 Each subsystemcom-
prises a specific set of attributes (Table 1), each
of which can be further disaggregated.74,78,79 While
higher level attributes are universal to any SES, lower
level attributes are specific to particular systems.79,80
The SES framework provides a heuristic tool for
characterizing conservation interventions and their
impacts.77 Conservation interventions are policies,
programs, and projects—often novel governance
systems—designed to shape the behavior of spe-
cific actors and thus conserve natural resources.81
These interactions are embedded within a broader
social and ecological context that shapes—and is
shaped by—the performance of the conservation
intervention.16 Thus, rearranging the SES subsys-
tems can highlight the relationships between a
governance-focused conservation intervention and
its impacts (Fig. 2). As a classificatory system, how-
ever, the SES framework does not provide guid-
ance regarding thehypothesized causal relationships
among variables or the research designs that one
might employ to examine these relationships.74
Impact-evaluation research design
Impact evaluation places particular emphasis on
research designs that permit causal inference.11,73
Causal inference rests on the comparison of
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Figure 1. The first-tier variables within a social–ecological system (SES). “The subsystems are (i) resource systems (e.g., a
designated protected park encompassing a specified territory containing forested areas, wildlife, and water systems), (ii) resource
units (e.g., trees, shrubs, and plants contained in the park, types of wildlife, and amount and flow of water), (iii) governance systems
(e.g., the government and other organizations that manage the park, the specific rules related to the use of the park, and how
these rules are made), and (iv) users (e.g., individuals who use the park in diverse ways for sustenance, recreation, or commercial
purposes). Each core subsystem is made up of multiple second-level variables (e.g., size of a resource system, mobility of a resource
unit, level of governance, users’ knowledge of the resource system) . . . which are further composed of deeper level variables.”68
Used with permission fromMcGinnis and Ostrom;74 adapted from Ref. 68.
outcomes observed under an intervention with
an estimate of what would have happened
in the absence of that intervention (i.e., the
counterfactual);82 this comparison provides an esti-
mate of the intended and unintended impacts
attributable to an intervention.73,82 Causal rela-
tionships between an intervention and its impacts
can be explored with experiments (where ran-
dom assignment to treatment and nontreatment
groups is feasible)82 or, more commonly in SESs,
quasiexperiments that apply statistical techniques
(e.g., regression discontinuity, matched compar-
isons, and synthetic controls)73,82 to control for sys-
tematic differences between treated (e.g., MPA) and
untreated (e.g., non-MPA) groups. Other research
designs are also employed in impact evaluation (e.g.,
in-depth case studies), “though the credibility of
their estimates of program effects relies on how
well the studies’ designs rule out competing causal
explanations.”83
Central to impact evaluation is the exclusion of
alternative explanations for the outcomes observed
in intervention sites.84 Impact evaluations control
for factors that may bias the magnitude or direction
of impact estimates (e.g., attributes of the actors
(A), resource systems (RS), resource units (RU),
and social and ecological context (S; ECO)),85 thus
creating analyses of paired SESs that vary only in
their governance and, perhaps, in their outcomes
(Fig. 3). All other subsystems (and elements) of
the SES framework (e.g., GS) represent variables
that researchers must control for (e.g., through
randomization or statistical matching) or explicitly
incorporate into analyses as explanatory variables.
Where SESs processes in an intervention influence
the status of outcome variables (e.g., biomass
and economic well-being) in nonintervention
sites, appropriate impact evaluation design must
also employ methods to eliminate bias arising
from either leakage (e.g., the displacement of
harvest effort from intervention to noninterven-
tion sites)86 or spill-over effects (e.g., increased
harvest in nonintervention sites due to biomass
increases generated by intervention).51 At their
simplest, comparative analyses of these paired SESs
allow researchers to document the impacts of an
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Table 1. The second-tier variables of a social–ecological
system (SES)74
First-tier variable Second-tier variable
Social, economic,
and political
settings (S)
S1—Economic development
S2—Demographic trends
S3—Political stability
S4—Other governance trends
S5—Market stability
S6—Media organizations
S7—Technology
Resource systems
(RS)
RS1—Sector (e.g., water, pasture,
forests, and fish)
RS2—Clarity of system boundaries
RS3—Size of resource systems
RS4—Human-constructed facilities
RS5—Productivity of system
RS6—Equilibrium properties
RS7—Predictability of system dynamics
RS8—Storage characteristics
RS9—Location
Governance systems
(GS)
GS1—Government organizations
GS2—Nongovernmental organizations
GS3—Network structure
GS4—Property rights systems
GS5—Operational-choice rules
GS6—Collective-choice rules
GS7—Constitutional-choice rules
GS8—Monitoring and sanctioning
rules
Resource units (RU) RU1—Resource unit mobility
RU2—Growth or replacement rate
RU3—Interaction among resource
units
RU4—Economic value
RU5—Number of resource units
RU6—Distinctive characteristics
RU7—Spatial and temporal
characteristics
Actors (A) A1—Number of relevant actors
A2—Socioeconomic attributes
A3—History or past experiences
A4—Location
A5—Leadership/entrepreneurship
A6—Norms (trust-reciprocity)/social
capital
A7—Knowledge of SES/mental models
A8—Importance of resource
(dependence)
A9—Technologies available
Action situations:
interactions (I)–
outcomes (O)
I1—Harvesting
I2—Information sharing
I3—Deliberation processes
Continued
Table 1. Continued
First-tier variable Second-tier variable
I4—Conflicts
I5—Investment activities
I6—Lobbying activities
I7—Self-organizing activities
I8—Networking activities
I9—Monitoring activities
I10—Evaluative activities
O1—Social performance measures
(e.g., efficiency, equity, sustainability,
and accountability)
O2—Ecological performance measures
(e.g., overharvested, resilience,
biodiversity, and sustainability)
O3—Externalities to other SESs
Related ecosystems
(ECO)
ECO1—Climate patterns
ECO2—Pollution patterns
ECO3—Flows into and out of focal
SESs
Note: Adapted from Ref. 78.
intervention (e.g., Refs. 87 and 88), while emerging
approaches highlight the potential to explore the
mechanisms and pathways by which impacts occur
(e.g., Ref. 89), variation in impacts within and
among groups, the attributes of an intervention
that foster positive (or negative) impacts, and the
contexts in which an intervention is most likely to
succeed or fail.12,90 The SES framework provides
a valuable heuristic for researchers attempting to
identify and control for systematic biases that might
confound the relationship between interventions
and outcomes, precluding causal inference. Sub-
stantial barriers to understanding the impact of
interventions on SESs remain, however, given that
impact evaluation provides no guidance regarding
the specific variables to measure in a given SES or
the hypothesized relationships among them.91
Common-pool resource governance theory
Theories of common-pool resource governance92–94
seek to explain the emergence, evolution, and per-
formance of regimes governing common-pool nat-
ural resources and analogous systems. In common
pool resources, use is rival (i.e., use by one individ-
ual diminishes the resources available to another)
and exclusion of potential resource users is difficult
or costly, creating the potential for overexploitation
of scarce resources.95,96 Theories of common-
pool resource governance have highlighted four
97Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1399 (2017) 93–115 C© 2017 The Authors. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of New York Academy of Sciences.
Analyzing conservation impacts Mascia et al.
Figure 2. The first-tier variables within a social–ecological system (SES), reorganized to emphasize the causal relationships
between governance systems and outcomes. Conservation interventions often represent novel governance systems that induce a
causal chain of events with intended and unintended consequences, feedback loops, synergies, and trade-offs. Related ecosystems
(ECO) and social, economic, and political settings (S) in Figure 1 are collectively represented here as contextual variables. Solid
lines represent direct links; dashed lines represent feedback mechanisms. Numbered arrows represent links labeled in Figure 1 as
(1) “set rules for,” (2) “set conditions for,” (3) “participate in,” (4) “set conditions for,” (5) “are inputs to,” and (6) “are part of.”
Numbered arrows (7–10) represent feedback mechanisms.
dimensions of governance that profoundly affect the
performance of regimes governing fisheries, forests,
grasslands, and other common-pool resources:
decision-making arrangements (Table 1; GS6, GS7),
resource-use rights (GS4, GS5), monitoring and
enforcement systems (GS8), and conflict-resolution
mechanisms.78,92 In each of these four dimensions,
research has identified variables hypothesized to
shape outcomes in specific ways (Table 2). Theories
of common-pool resource governance also provide
insights into the diverse factors that foster the
emergence and evolution of governance regimes
through collective action,92 highlighting the com-
plex relationships among different components
of the SES framework.78 Indeed, many elements
of the SES framework have their origins in the
early analytic frameworks of the literature on
common-pool resource governance.77,97
Originally developed in the context of small-scale
common-pool resource systems,92,98,99 theories
of common-pool resource governance are valid
starting hypotheses for predicting impacts of
conservation interventions in larger and more
complex SESs.77,78 Ostrom’s design principles
for sustainable regimes,92,93 for example, are
hypotheses to operationalize and test within an
impact-evaluation research design (Fig.4). Though
the large number of potential explanatory variables
complicates hypothesis testing,94 and reductionist
methods may obscure emergent properties,74,79
careful attention to research design can help
to address these challenges.77,97 Thus, theories
of common-pool resource governance have the
potential to catalyze a substantive advance in the
rigor and reach of impact evaluations.91 Likewise,
rigorous research designs informed by impact
evaluation may foster important insights into
common-pool resource governance theory.
Operationalizing 3FIGS: MPAs as an
illustrative example
MPAs illustrate the potential for an integrated three-
framework approach to influence evaluation of
common-pool resource governance in SESs. MPAs
are an exemplar of an SES69,78 increasingly exam-
ined through the lens of impact evaluation22,43,100
and the theories of common-pool resource
governance.16,101 However, like studies of other
conservation interventions, MPA research has yet
to fully integrate the research questions, methods,
and study designs of impact evaluation; the prin-
ciples and hypotheses of common-pool resource
governance theory; and the conceptual framework
of SESs. Here, we outline the potential for 3FIGS
to provide an integrated approach to examining
the impacts of conservation interventions, drawing
upon the SES framework (Fig. 1) to identify (1)
the potential ecological and social outcomes of an
intervention and (2) the confounding ecological
and social processes to be controlled to obtain
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Figure 3. Directed acyclic graph (DAG) illustrating how the essential social–ecological relationshipsmay be examined through the
lens of impact evaluation. Contextual variables in Figure 2 are illustrated here as confounding variables that are explicitly controlled
through research design. We use the term impact to denote a generic treatment effect (i.e., the causal impact of an intervention on
a variable of interest).
an unbiased estimate of MPA impacts. Having
identified potential outcome variables, impact-
evaluation research designs provide a methodology
for documenting MPA impacts while controlling
for confounding SES interactions and processes
(Fig. 3). Finally, elements of common-pool resource
governance, nested as differential treatments within
an impact-evaluation research design, allow an
examination of the mechanisms by which MPAs
have ecological and social impacts (Fig. 4).
MPA governance systemsc
Governance constitutes the processes by which
authority is conferred, by which authoritative deci-
sions are made, and by which these decisions are
enforced andmodified.102–104 Governance is a prin-
cipal component of SESs,78 structuring human
interactions across all levels of social organization
(Fig. 2).104,105 Like many conservation interven-
tions, MPAs are, essentially, novel governance sys-
tems that explicitly or implicitly define whomay do
what—and where, when, and how they may do it—
with respect to a specific, spatially bounded portion
of the environment (denoted by blue elements in
Fig. 2).16 In many cases, MPAs are layered upon
existing marine governance systems, modifying or
replacing the prior governance regime.
cThis section is adapted from and builds upon Ref. 16.
The four principal components of MPA gover-
nance (decision-making arrangements, resource-
use rules, monitoring and enforcement systems,
and conflict-resolution mechanisms) directly and
indirectly shape human resource-use patterns and,
ultimately, the ecological and social impacts of
MPAs.16 Each of these four elements may have both
formal and informal components derived from
diverse sources, including legal statutes, policy state-
ments, judicial decisions, organizational practices,
social norms, and cultural traditions. As a result, the
de facto system of governance that actually governs
anMPAoften differs sharply from the de jure regime
established through formal legal structures and pol-
icy processes.16 The de facto system of rules and the
processes through which these rules are developed,
implemented, and adapted over time significantly
influence MPA impacts. Specific governance
characteristics—known as design principles—are
associated with long-term sustainability in institu-
tions governing common-pool resources,92 such as
conservation interventions.22,106
MPA decision-making arrangements specify the
rights of individuals or groups to make choices
regarding other aspects ofMPAdesign andmanage-
ment. Decision-making arrangements shape rules
governing resource use by defining the interests rep-
resented andmanifested in policymaking processes.
Collective-choice rules (Table 1;GS6)determine, for
example, who may participate in making decisions
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Table 2. Domains of marine protected area (MPA) governance, hypothesized attributes of successful MPA gover-
nance, and illustrative indicators to monitor16,22,130
Domain Hypothesized attribute Illustrative indicator
Decision-making
arrangements
Resource users participate in decision making Proportion of user groups participating in
decision to establish MPA
Resource user may self-govern resource use Proportion of users whose right to
self-organize is minimally recognized by
government
Resource-use rights Resource users defined clearly Proportion of important users subject to
specific appropriation rule
Resources defined clearly Proportion of MPA boundary clearly
demarcated to users
Resource user costs and benefits roughly
proportional
MPA cost–benefit ratio to resource users
Resource user rights linked to local conditions Proportion of MPA rules context dependent
Monitoring and
enforcement systems
Monitors assess resource conditions
Monitors assess user behavior
Ecological monitoring patrol frequency
Compliance monitoring patrol frequency
Monitors are resource users or are accountable
to users
Sanctions for failing to monitor resource
Sanctions for noncompliance likely Frequency of sanctions for noncompliance
Sanctions for noncompliance graduated Mean types of sanctions levied for
noncompliance
Sanctions for noncompliance context dependent Mean number of contextual factors
considered when imposing sanction for
noncompliance
Conflict-resolution
mechanisms
Conflict-resolution mechanisms accessible to users Mean time/cost to resolve conflict
Note: Domains, hypothesized attributes, and illustrative indicators derived from theories of common-pool resource governance.92,93
and who may not (e.g., government officials and
resource users), how decision makers are selected
for their positions (e.g., elected or appointed), and
how decisions aremade (e.g., consensus ormajority
vote).92 Constitutional-choice arrangements (GS7)
define how decisions aremade regarding the config-
uration of collective-choice arrangements;92 these
higher order social institutions shape both MPA
governance and impacts by defining how site-level
rules aremade andwhomakes them.16 Subtle differ-
ences in the rules that govern MPA decision mak-
ing may have significant impacts on MPA design,
implementation, and evaluation (e.g., U.S. National
Marine Sanctuaries).107 Governance regimes that
recognize the rights of resource users to participate
in decision making and to self-govern tend to be
more effective than those that centralize authority
in a few individuals or actors (Table 2).92
Rules governing resource use (Table 1; GS4,
GS5) are the second principal element of MPA
governance. Resource-use rules (denoted by arrow 1
in Fig. 2)—including laws, regulations, formal and
informal policies, codes of conduct, and social
norms—specify the rights of individuals or groups
to access and appropriate resources. Held by indi-
viduals, groups, organizations, or the state, these
rights establish standards for interactions among
individuals and between individuals and themarine
environment (“actors” and “interactions” in Fig. 2).
Infinite possible configurations of resource-use
rules exist, ranging along a continuum from “open
access” (i.e., no rules/any and all uses) to a complete
prohibition on human activities. Rules may apply
to specific locations, times, resources, and actors.
Individuals or groups may be defined by actors’
identities, geographic proximity, tenure, activity
type (e.g., consumptive versus nonconsumptive),
intent (e.g., targeted species, recreational versus
commercial activity), or practices (e.g., fishing
gear). Consequently, the rules governing marine
resources may shape the direction, magnitude,
and distribution of MPA impacts. Four attributes
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Figure 4. Alternative hypotheses from theories of common-pool resource governance examined through the lens of impact
evaluations. The relative treatment effect of paired conservation interventions, representing the single null (Tri) or alternative
common-pool resource hypotheses (Trj) (e.g., protected area without active and accountable monitoring versus protected area with
active and accountable monitoring), can be examined through impact evaluation. Contextual variables in Figure 2 are illustrated
here as confounding variables that are explicitly controlled through research design. We use the term impact to denote a generic
treatment effect (i.e., the causal impact of an intervention on a variable of interest). “Comparative impact” refers to the net difference
in treatment effects between conservation interventions i and j.
of resource-use rights are associated with sus-
tainable governance systems: (1) clearly defined
resource users, (2) clearly defined resources, (3)
contextually appropriate resource-use rights, and
(4) roughly proportional impacts on resource
users.92,93 Unclear boundaries may limit the ability
of resource users to develop appropriate rules and
monitor compliance. Incongruent rules or those
with disproportionate effects on particular social
or economic groups may undermine compliance.92
Ecologists also note that MPA age, size, location,
spatial configuration, and fishing prohibitions—all
manifestations of resource-use rights—often shape
MPA impacts (Table 2) (e.g., Refs. 38, 39, and 41).
MPA monitoring systems (Table 1; I9, GS8) seek
to track changes in the state of MPA-associated
social and environmental systems. MPA monitor-
ing systems vary in what they measure and who
does the measuring, as well as where, when, and
how measurements are made. Monitoring can pro-
vide decision makers with insights on social and
ecological conditions (ambient monitoring), track
the progress of management actions toward a spec-
ified goal (performance measurement), or docu-
ment the intended or unintended impacts of MPA
establishment (impact evaluation).90 In addition,
the involvement of resource users and other non-
scientists in formal data collection and analysis (i.e.,
participatorymonitoring)may also provide amech-
anism for increasing awareness, improving resource
management, and empowering communities.108 In
practice, relatively few MPAs have comprehen-
sive monitoring systems; resource users, managers,
and other stakeholders often informally monitor
environmental and social indicators to assess MPA
performance (Table 2).16
Sanctioning systems (Table 1; GS8) attempt to
increase compliance with rules governing resource
use by monitoring user behavior (I9) and pun-
ishing those engaged in prohibited activities. By
increasing the severity and likelihood of sanc-
tions and thus raising the opportunity cost of
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noncompliance, enforcement systems act directly
on resource users to foster adherence to established
rules. Research highlights six attributes of monitor-
ing and sanctioning systems that are hypothesized
to enhance performance of MPAs and other nat-
ural resource governance regimes: monitoring sys-
tems that assess (1) resource conditions and (2) user
behavior; and (3) ensure accountability to users;
and enforcement systems with (4) meaningful but
(5) graduated and (6) context-dependent sanctions,
which ensure that the punishment fits the crime
(Table 2).92
Lastly, conflict-resolution mechanisms are for-
mal and informal processes for resolving disputes.
Conflict-resolution mechanisms permit informa-
tion exchange, clarification of resource-use rights,
and adjudication of disputes related to deci-
sion making, resource use, monitoring, and
enforcement. Though not highlighted in the SES
framework, readily accessible and low-cost conflict-
resolution mechanisms enhance regime perfor-
mance by mitigating social conflict and thereby
minimizing resource overexploitation and dissipa-
tion of benefits from common-pool resources.92
Conflict-resolution mechanisms also enhance MPA
performance by giving voice to aggrieved parties
and acknowledging their concerns, which increases
the legitimacy of MPA rules and regulations. Evi-
dence suggests that (1) rapid, (2) low-cost, and (3)
easily accessible conflict-resolutionmechanisms are
more likely to facilitate negotiation between actors
than more complex, expensive, or remote systems
(Table 2).92
Resource-use patterns: actors and their
interactions
MPA governance regimes (Fig. 1; GS) directly
and indirectly structure interactions (I) between
humans (A) and marine species (RU) and ecosys-
tems (RS) by defining the rules governing resource
use and by shaping rates of compliance with these
rules. These patterns of consumptive and noncon-
sumptive resource access, use, and appropriation
(shown in blue in Fig. 2; I1) may be character-
ized by five sets of variables: the resources used;
demographic attributes of the users; location of
use; timing of use; and mode of use.109 (In other
words, what is being used by whom, where, when,
and how?) The demographics of resource use—who
uses resources—can be characterized by both the
number of users (A1) and their social attributes (A2;
e.g., gender, age, class, place of residence, education,
culture, ethnicity, and religion), though not all of
these variables will be salient in all cases. Actors’ past
experiences (A3),mentalmodels (A7), anddegreeof
resource dependence (A8) also shape resource-use
patterns. Location (A4) and timingof use also define
resource-use patterns in simple but important ways.
Lastly, the mode (A9) and intensity of resource use,
including both consumptive (e.g., fishing) and non-
consumptive practices (e.g., dive tourism), are key
characteristics of actors’ resource-use patterns.110
Resource-use patterns may vary in any one or all
of these dimensions; these differences may lead to
significant differences in the biological and social
impacts of MPAs.37,109
Resource systems, units, and interactions
Resource-use patterns are structured by characteris-
tics of resource systems and resource units (as illus-
tratedby green elements inFig. 2).Mostwildmarine
plants and animals (Table 1; RS1) are common-pool
resources characterized by a high degree of rivalry
and by difficulty of excluding others,92 though some
marine species and ecosystemshavedistinctive char-
acteristics (RU6) and clear boundaries (RS2) that
facilitate exclusion. The abundance (RU5), eco-
nomic value (RU4), and spatial and temporal dis-
tribution (RS3, RS9, and RU7) of marine resources
all influence the likelihood of (un)sustainable use.
Similarly, resource productivity (RS5) and robust-
ness (depletability; RU2)—the ability of a resource
to sustain itself in the face of human use (e.g., based
on population growth rates)—differentiate marine
species and ecosystems fromeach other.111 Resource
mobility (i.e., spatial movement of the resource,
independent of user actions; RU1) and the capacity
for storage (i.e., to capture and retain the resource
for later use; RS8) are also key attributes that shape
how humans govern and use marine resources.112
Additional biological attributes of living marine
resources (e.g., species, size, sex, age, and behav-
ior) may shape how people interact with the marine
environment and the impacts of these interactions.
MPA outcomes
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that
resource attributes, human resource-use patterns,
and local context (discussed below) influence the
ecological conditions (Table 1; O2) within and
adjacent to an MPA. Common population-level
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Table 3. Ecological domains, attributes, and illustrative indicators of the ecological impacts of marine protected
areas (MPAs)113–115
Domain Attribute Illustrative indicator
Population Numeric density Count of individuals per unit area
Biomass Abundance multiplied by mean weight
Age structure Frequency distributions of age classes
Recruitment Count of larvae per unit area
Community Species richness Number of species per survey
Species diversity Simpson diversity index
Trophic structure Distribution of trophic levels in species assemblage
Functional redundancy Number of species within functional groups
Ecosystem Productivity Fishery production
Habitat characteristics Extent
Coastal processes Sediment cycling
Herbivory Grazing rates
indicators of MPA ecological conditions include
numeric density, biomass, and age and size structure
of fish and invertebrates; ecological community-
level indicators include species richness and diver-
sity, trophic structure, and functional redundancy;
and ecosystem-level attributes include habitat char-
acteristics and key ecological processes (Table 3)
(e.g., Refs. 113–115). In general, increases in these
metrics suggest positive MPA impacts, although
ecological dynamics associated with some “effec-
tive” MPAs may result in declines in some indica-
tors (e.g., prey species decline following recovery of
predators).116,117
MPAs and other conservation interventions
directly and indirectly influence human well-being
through multiple pathways and mechanisms.89,118
By introducing new systems of marine resource
governance, MPAs may enhance or reshape the
flows of marine ecosystem services,22,119 including
provisioning services (e.g., finfish and invertebrate
fisheries); regulatory services (e.g., carbon seques-
tration); cultural services (e.g., tourism); and sup-
porting services (e.g., biodiversity; Table 4).120–122
MPAgovernance regimes alsodefinewhomayaccess
these flows, reallocating the benefits of ecosystem
services within and among social groups.47,123 Thus,
MPAs shape the size of the marine resource pie (via
ecosystemservices) anddeterminewhogets a slice of
the pie (via property rights) and the size of the slice
allocated to each individual (via property rights).
In addition, the infrastructure and ideas associated
with a conservation interventionmay influence eco-
nomic activities and social behavior, with direct and
indirect consequences for human well-being (e.g.,
Refs. 124 and 125).
The social impacts (Table 1; O1) of MPAs may
be measured using diverse frameworks and indica-
tors (e.g., UN Millennium Development Goals and
UNHumanDevelopment Index).126,127 Each frame-
work provides an alternative structure for char-
acterizing human well-being, but they frequently
share core constructs, such as economic well-being,
health, security and political empowerment, edu-
cation, and culture.22,43,128 Within each domain,
indicators (Table 5) may be measured at one
or more levels of social organization.129 In
Indonesia, for example, indices of material assets
measure economic well-being at household,130
settlement,131 and district levels.132 Measuringmul-
tiple dimensions of human well-being allows one
to examine synergies, trade-offs, and equity among
outcomes.123,133
MPA impacts have ripple effects in space,
time, and among outcomes (often referred to as
“spillovers” or “leakage”; these impacts are both
dynamic and complex, as studies of fishers have
shown).57,63,134 For example, the redistribution
of fishing effort from an MPA can increase the
cost of fishing and lower profitability as a result
of increased travel distance (and associated costs),
increased exploratory fishing, and aggregation
of fishing pressure in non-MPA locations.47,51,135
Observational studies34,35,86,136 and bioeconomic
models137,138 indicate that stock recovery and
ecological spillover (net emigration of adult
biomass and larvae) from areas where fishing is
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Table 4. Ecosystem service domains, attributes, and
illustrative indicators of the ecosystem service impacts
of marine protected areas (MPAs)120–122
Domain Attribute Illustrative indicator
Provisioning Fisheries Fisheries catch
Materials Volume mined
Supporting Biodiversity Number of species
Regulatory Carbon
sequestration
Mangrove biomass
Cultural Tourism Annual value of tourism
Recreation Scuba diving annual value
Existence values Nonuse existence value
prohibited can result in increased fish abundance
and catch per unit effort in fishable areas, thereby
mitigating some or all of these costs. In addition
to changes in fishing costs and catch, shifts in the
catchability of target species and redistribution
of fishing effort result in market feedbacks (e.g.,
prices, quantity demanded and supplied); fishers
may subsequently adapt by changing their harvest
strategies.44,51,57 Bioeconomic models and theory
provide insights into these complex interactions
and adaptive behavioral strategies, predicting how
MPA economic impacts will vary over time and
space (e.g., Refs. 63, 137, and 139). These spillovers
influence research design, necessitating that studies
address the manner in which these ripple effects
may influence observations in non-MPA locations.
If spillovers result in improved ecological conditions
at a control site, for example, this will reduce dif-
ferences in conditions inside and outside the MPA,
resulting in a more conservative estimate of MPA
impacts.24 Establishing control sites at a distance
beyond the expected influence of such spillovers
allows for more reliable estimates of MPA impacts
(see Ref. 70 and the case study described below).
Context
Elucidating the relationship between MPA inter-
actions and outcomes requires controlling for
contextual factors that may affect the likelihood
of interventions or the nature of impacts. Marine
resource governance (Fig. 1; GS), human activities
(I), and ecological and social outcomes (O), for
example, are shaped by the ecological (ECO)
and social, economic, and political (S) context
within which they are embedded.78,140 Context
may manifest in a variety of ways, across a variety
of scales, influencing the likelihood of a conser-
vation intervention occurring,18 its governance
characteristics,141 and, ultimately, its social and
ecological impacts.70 Controlling for context—and
other exogenous factors—allows one to measure
the impact of an MPA by isolating the causal
relationship between the intervention (i.e., MPA
establishment) and its impacts (i.e., resultant
changes in ecological and social conditions).
Biophysical context (ECO) has a substantive
effect on marine resource governance, human
behavior, and site-level social and ecological condi-
tions. Conservation interventions are preferentially
established in areas of high biological importance
(e.g., high biodiversity or endemism)142,143 and
low-opportunity costs of conservation (e.g., remote
areas),144,145 with MPAs predominantly occurring
in coastal areas146—all illustrations of selection
bias in the siting of MPAs. Biophysical context
also structures historic and current human uses of
the marine environment in and around MPAs; for
example, upwelling areas of high productivity are
often targeted by fishers, while high wave exposure
can deter small-scale fishers.147 Large-scale bio-
physical factors, such as temperature, productivity,
habitat connectivity, and vulnerability to large
storms, have shaped present-day ecosystems and
continue to influenceMPA ecological conditions.148
Localized biophysical characteristics (e.g., wave
exposure, depth, reef type, and benthic habitat
characteristics) similarly influence the ecological
community structure of MPAs and MPA responses
to natural and anthropogenic disturbances—and
conservation interventions.149,150 For example,
the ecological recovery of corals within MPAs,
which are associated with increases in herbivorous
parrotfish, can be greater in sheltered areas where
algae grow slowly.151 These biophysical character-
istics may subsequently influence MPA impacts on
human well-being, through ecological changes that
have cascading effects on social conditions (e.g.,
ecosystem productivity may influence the intensity,
duration, and yield of fishing efforts).
Social context (S) also shapes marine resource
governance, human activities, and social and
ecological impacts. Social structure influences the
probability of collective action and self-governance,
with decentralized governance structures more
likely to emerge where the probability of local
collective action is high.152 Traditions of customary
marine tenure, for example, may foster local MPA
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Table 5. Social domains, attributes, and illustrative indicators of the impacts of marine protected areas
Domain Attribute Illustrative indicator
Economic well-being Occupation Primary occupation
Economic status Household material assets index
Trend in economic status
Fishing characteristics Primary fishing technique
Household dependence on marine protein
Economic dependence on marine fisheries
Health Food security Household food security index
Child food security index
Catch per unit effort
Birth rate Birth rate
Adolescent birth rate
Mortality Infant mortality rate
Under-five mortality rate
Adult mortality rate
Morbidity Household disease rate
Household disease burden
Political empowerment Resource rights Household marine tenure index
Community organization Participation in community groups
Financial contribution to marine community groups
Female participation in marine community groups
Political engagement Voting rates
Education Formal education Adult literacy rates
School enrollment rates
Environmental education Awareness of threats to marine environment
Awareness of marine conservation actions
Culture Place attachment Mean place attachment
Social conflict Trends in social conflict
Note: All indicators may be disaggregated by demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, wealth, education, and class) to explore
the distributive impacts of MPAs.42,47,118,130
establishment.6 At the same time, a lack of human
capacity may limit the potential for MPA coman-
agement or collaborative adaptive management.153
National social context, by contrast, explains
little variation in MPA abundance and spatial
extent;18 for example, fishers per capita does not
influenceMPA establishment at the national level.18
Social structures (e.g., occupational structures
and resource dependence) also shape MPA use
rights and other aspects of marine resource
governance.141,154 Differences in social systems
(e.g., societal values and demographic trends (S2))
may also influence MPA impacts; social cohesion,
for example, correlates positively with fisheries
management outcomes.155
Similarly, economic context influences marine
resource governance, human activities, and ecolog-
ical and social conditions. MPAs are often situated
where opportunity costs for extractive uses are
low,145 creating considerable selection bias that
must be accounted for when comparing MPA to
non-MPA locations.70 Market access (Table 1, S5),
for example, may influence MPA establishment
and governance.141 Market access also influences
resource use and ecological conditions, as well
as human well-being in coastal settings;140,156,157
economic development has also been linked to
fish biomass.158 Market access may also influence
the extent to which local communities depend
on marine resources, which, in turn, may medi-
ate the magnitude of MPA impacts on human
well-being.42,63 For example, households with high
dependence on marine resources are more likely
to be affected by the reallocation of resource rights
linked to MPA establishment.42 More broadly,
the economic value of fishery resources has been
shown to determine when and where fisheries
develop159 and whether overexploitation is likely
to occur.160 Fishing activity is heavily influenced by
the opportunity costs of fishing (i.e., the next best
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alternative income)63 and economic incentives,
where fishing costs (including distance) and
expected returns (price, catch per unit effort) influ-
ence fishing locations, intensity, frequency, and gear
choice.44,57
Lastly, political context (S)may also shapemarine
resource governance, human activities, and social
and ecological conditions.6,18,69,157 Country-level
governance characteristics (e.g., political stability
(S3), voice, and accountability) do not appear
closely correlated with MPA establishment, though
enabling legislation can accelerate MPA establish-
ment (e.g., the Philippines),18 and shifts in marine
resource governancemay track the evolution of gov-
ernance in postcolonial states.6 Decision-making
arrangements may also influence MPA size and
location; scattered evidence suggests that decentral-
ization policies foster many small coastal MPAs,
whereas centralized decision making is associated
with fewer, larger, and more remote MPAs.18,161
One might expect rule of law, corruption, account-
ability, and other contextual political factors to
shape human behavior within MPAs—and MPA
impacts—through macrolevel influences on fishing
practices, tourism, or land use, but research has not
yet examined these relationships fully (but see Ref.
162). The history of marine resource governance
may shape ecological and social context and thus the
probability ofMPA establishment and/or the nature
of MPA impacts, though rigorous research designs
should control for such histories and other aspects
of political context (for an example, see Box 1).
Box 1. 3FIGS in action: impact evaluation of MPAs in the Bird’s Head Seascape, West
Papua, Indonesia
In the Bird’s Head Seascape (BHS) of West Papua, Indonesia, an interdisciplinary teamd is applying the 3FIGS
approach to document and explain the social and ecological impacts of MPAs (Fig. 5).70,130 The BHS is
recognized for its exceptional cultural and biological diversity, but human activities (e.g., destructive fishing
practices and coastal sedimentation) have jeopardized both the ecological integrity of the region and the
livelihoods of its resource-dependent residents.163 Given these challenges, local and international organizations
partnered to establish 12 MPAs within the BHS, encompassing more than 35,000 km2. Through these MPAs,
“empowered and capable Papuan communities, governments, and local partners protect their critical coastal
and marine ecosystems, thereby protecting the single greatest reservoir of tropical marine species on the planet,
while enhancing food security, livelihood opportunities, as well as their cultural heritage and traditional
ownership rights.”164 These MPAs, which include both multiple-use areas and no-fishing areas, establish
preferential use rights for local residents that enable these residents to fish for subsistence and commercial use
within the MPAs and empower them to exclude nonresidents ineligible to fish within the MPAs.
To determine the social and ecological impacts of the BHS MPAs and to test the null hypothesis of “no
impact,” the scientific team employed a quasiexperimental impact evaluation informed by SESs to identify both
outcome variables and potential confounders. To measure social impacts, the team first established baselines for
eight MPAs and matched non-MPA controls. In addition to basic demographic information, household surveys
documented human well-being (O1) using more than 150 indicators across five social domains: economic
well-being, health, political empowerment, education, and culture. To identify non-MPA control households,
the team used a multistep matching process at each MPA, designed to control for confounding processes
(identified from the SES classificatory framework). An initial coarse match identified non-MPA settlements with
key characteristics similar to MPA settlements. Drawing on the SES framework, coarse matching variables
included occupation, social structure, market access, and political jurisdiction as proxies for the key attributes of
context (S), resource systems (RS), resource units (RU), and actors (A) that may affect participation in an MPA
or its outcomes. After the team surveyed these settlements (having used power analysis to determine the
appropriate sample sizes for each settlement and each MPA in its entirety), it used Mahalanobis metric matching
(a nearest-neighbor statistical matching method) to identify pairs of MPA and similar non-MPA households
with similar observable characteristics. Statistical matching procedures, within an impact evaluation research
dThe team is led by authors M.B. Mascia, H.E. Fox, L. Glew, and G. Ahmadia, as well as professor Fitryanti Pakiding
of the University of Papua in Indonesia.
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design, allowed the team to control for observable characteristics related to socioeconomic attributes (A2),
ethnic composition (A6), and number of actors (A1) that could influence subgroup treatment effects (e.g.,
relative impacts on fisher versus nonfisher households). Baseline monitoring occurred in 2010–2012, following
legal establishment of the MPAs and designation of boundaries, but before development of management plans
and implementation of MPA zoning plans. To minimize the potential for spillover or leakage effects to bias
estimates of MPA social impacts, control households and their fishing grounds were identified beyond known
distances for economically meaningful levels of fish population spillover. Repeat data collection occurs at 2-year
intervals until 4 years postbaseline, at which point monitoring will occur at 3-year intervals. The team uses
difference-in-difference estimates of statistically matched MPA and non-MPA households to calculate the
average treatment effect (i.e., impact) of each MPA for each of the social indicators. Demographic and spatial
data allow the team to explore a targeted subset of spatial and temporal synergies, trade-offs, and equity within
and among social groups and across domains of human well-being (O1), as well as to test hypotheses derived
from theories of common-pool resource governance on the role of governance in shaping social impacts.
To monitor the ecological impacts of BHS MPAs, the scientific team adopted an analogous research design to
measure changes in common reef ecosystem indicators (O2). Indicators included benthic (coral, other
invertebrate and algal communities) and fish community attributes (e.g., abundance, size, and biomass of key
reef species). After initially establishing ecological baselines within MPA boundaries (2009–2011), the team
subsequently employed coarse matching methods to identify corresponding non-MPA controls (on the basis of
10 contextual variables describing structural, biophysical, and social features of coral reef sites (ECO, S))70 and
completed ecological baselines in control sites in 2012. Transect-to-transect statistical matching allows direct
“apples-to-apples” comparisons of MPA and non-MPA coral reefs. Subsequent monitoring is occurring at
2-year intervals through baseline +4 years, at which point monitoring will occur at 2- to 3-year intervals. To
reduce the risk of contaminated estimates of ecological impacts, control sites were sited beyond estimated
distances for ecologically meaningful levels of fish population spillover.70 As with social impacts, the team uses
difference-in-difference estimates of changes in statistically matched MPA and non-MPA underwater transects
to calculate the average treatment effect of each MPA across the ecological indicators. Life history and spatial
data allow the team to explore a targeted subset of spatial and temporal synergies, trade-offs, and heterogeneities
within and among ecological groups and across domains of ecological condition (O2). Larval dispersal and fish
migratory behaviors can generate large-scale spillover effects, constraining the effectiveness of conventional use
of fixed distance to minimize bias arising from interactions between intervention and nonintervention sites.70
Consequently, estimates of MPA impact are interpreted with caution, particularly for highly mobile species.
To explain these social and ecological impacts and to test the null hypothesis that governance does not
influence MPA outcomes, the team also monitors marine resource governance (decision-making arrangements
(GS4), resource-use rights (GS5, GS6), monitoring and enforcement systems (GS8, I9, I10), and
conflict-resolution mechanisms) in both MPA settlements and similar non-MPA controls.130 Linked focus group
discussions and key informant interviews provide data on key governance variables, allowing the team to test
hypotheses derived from theories of common-pool resource governance. The team employs purposive sampling
techniques to identify focus group participants and key informants in each settlement, given that knowledge of
governance processes is not distributed uniformly or randomly among residents. Data collection among
settlements occurs over two sampling periods; the data are pooled to estimate values for each governance
variable at each time step. Governance data allow the team to explore the role of specific governance variables
(GS) in shaping the direction, magnitude, and distribution of the social and ecological impacts of MPAs (O).
Discussion
Understanding what works, what does not, and
why outcomes differ are fundamental challenges
for conservation science and policy. A longstand-
ing focus on ecological dynamics and human
threats to biodiversity has led much of conserva-
tion to focus on what to conserve and where to
do so.165,166 A proliferation of initiatives, employed
by government agencies and nongovernmental
organizations, has emerged in response to these
threats.2 The limited scientific inquiry into the
impacts of these initiatives—both to make sense
of the world and to inform effective policy—
has been plagued by a lack of social theory91
and by weak research designs that fail to control
for alternate explanations of observed outcomes.11
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Figure 5. Application of the 3FIGS approach to understand the impacts of marine protected areas in the Bird’s Head Seascape,
Indonesia. Conservation interventions often represent novel governance systems that induce a causal chain of events with intended
and unintended consequences, feedback loops, synergies, and trade-offs. Related ecosystems (ECO) and social, economic, and
political settings (S) in Figure 1 are collectively represented here as contextual variables. Solid lines represent direct links; dashed
lines represent feedback mechanisms. Numbered arrows represent links labeled in Figure 1 as (1) “set rules for,” (2) “set conditions
for,” (3) “participate in,” (4) “set conditions for,” (5) “are inputs to,” and (6) “are part of.” Numbered arrows (7–10) represent
feedback mechanisms. Gray arrows and filled gray boxes represent elements of the social–ecological system that are explicitly
controlled for through quasiexperimental research design.
The social impacts of conservation interventions
remain particularly poorly understood.22,167 As a
result, inmany cases, conservation policymakers are
shooting in the dark, not knowing which interven-
tions work and which do not.11,168,169
The 3FIGS approach provides a novel and
robust means for documenting and explaining the
intended and unintended impacts of MPAs and
analogous biodiversity conservation interventions.
Impact evaluations of terrestrial and freshwater
protected areas, for example, could readily adopt
the 3FIGS framework and adapt the MPA exam-
ple to other biomes. Similarly, 3FIGS could be
readily adapted for other place-based conservation
interventions that focus on resource governance,
such as forest and fisheries certification, payments
for ecosystem services, and community-based
natural resource management. For conservation
interventions that focus on mechanisms other than
governance (e.g., environmental education and
economic reforms), the theoretical component
of 3FIGS can be modified from common-pool
resource governance to accommodate other social
theories and associated hypotheses (e.g., theories
of planned behavior, commodity chains). Appro-
priate research designs, theories, and conceptual
frameworks allow one to measure the direction,
magnitude, and distribution of social and ecological
impacts that emerge from conservation interven-
tions, as well as the heterogeneity of these impacts
among groups and across space and time. Examin-
ing MPAs and other conservation interventions as
policy experiments provides the basis for both better
understanding the world around us and designing
more effective conservation interventions.11,170,171
Caveats
Despite the power of a 3FIGS approach, however,
integrating impact-evaluation research design, the
SES conceptual framework, and hypotheses from
common-pool resource governance theory is not
a silver bullet for understanding the complex syn-
ergies and trade-offs that may emerge from MPAs
and other conservation interventions. Furthermore,
which interventions work and which do not may
depend on the context, which is important for
the interpretation and transferability to other con-
texts of impact evaluation results, which have high
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internal validity but low external validity. Con-
sequently, the practical application of the 3FIGs
approach may be easiest where harvested species
have limited mobility (minimizing spillover effects)
andwhere an intervention affects a subset of the SES
resource (creating a pool of viable control sites).
The reductionist framework provided by impact
evaluation imposes clear limits, both practical (e.g.,
complexity of sampling design)82 and analytic (e.g.,
subgroup treatment effects),172,173 on the scope of
any given analysis; a reductionist approach may be
insufficient to understand the full suite of feed-
backs and interactions between social–ecological
domains that are known to exist but remain poorly
documented.174 A classic example is “fishing the
line,”175 where an ecological response (i.e., higher
fish abundance in the MPA spilling over beyond
the boundary) drives a change in human behavior
(i.e., spatial reallocation of fishing effort to theMPA
boundary), which, in turn, may alter the ecologi-
cal response (i.e., differential mortality rates alter
fish behavior, lowering fish density close to MPA
boundaries).175 Similarly, identifying the unique
contributions of factors that may covary with gov-
ernance is a substantive challenge; for example,
administrative activities and capacities, such as
management plans, budgets, and staffing, have been
hypothesized to shape impacts of MPAs and other
conservation interventions,176 but supporting evi-
dence is weak.177–181 However, a recent study exam-
ining the relationship between management capac-
ity and ecological performance of MPAs has shown
that capacity gaps (e.g., budget and staffing) may
explain the unrealized conservation potential of
MPAs.24
While novel analytical approaches (e.g., Ref. 89)
increasingly enable researchers to explore com-
plex causal mechanisms and interaction effects,
minimum viable sample size182 and the danger
inherent to multiple hypothesis testing183 impose
hard limits on model specification. In effect,
the analytic constraints of impact evaluation will
require scholars to choose between (1) “black
box” approaches that are blind to the governance
attributes of the intervention to capture emer-
gent properties and feedbacks between outcomes
and (2) carefully bounded analyses that explore
the relationships among a subset of governance
hypotheses and outcomes. Narrative or model-
ing approaches, buttressed by specific, testable
hypotheses,may be required to disentangle complex
interactions.184
Frontiers
Novel data-acquisition tools andanalytic techniques
may enable scholars to provide insights into increas-
ingly complex questions about the impacts ofMPAs.
Crowd-sourced data and citizen science, for exam-
ple, may provide an opportunity to build suffi-
ciently large data sets to understand specific sets of
emergent properties and interactions. Recent high-
profileMPA research has benefited fromwidespread
observations by nonscientist scuba divers;38 marine
citizen science has also been used to examine global
population trends among manta rays.185 Similarly,
the increasingavailabilityof governmentmicro-data
in online archives (e.g., the World Bank micro-
data archives) will expand the geographic scope of
global synthesis studies, including explorations of
MPA social impacts. However, the emergence of Big
Data alone will not be sufficient to provide empiri-
cal insights on 3FIGS. Bayesian statistical techniques
that allow for the integration of qualitative data into
quantitativemodels (e.g., as informative priors) and
enhancedability todocument theuncertainty inher-
ent to specific estimates may both broaden the suite
of hypotheses that canbe addressed in a singlemodel
and provide more nuanced insights into the emer-
gent properties of SESs.
Some familiar challenges will likely remain,
despite novel data-acquisition approaches and ana-
lytic advances. Data-synthesis efforts require more
data than can be gathered by individual researchers
or research projects, particularly for interdisci-
plinary analysis. Spatial or temporal overlap of
ecological and social data-collection efforts is rare,
and meaningful integration of multidisciplinary
data sets poses both practical and theoretical
challenges.22 MPA synthesis efforts based on
published literature provide novel insights23,42
but are limited by methodological differences in
underlying studies (which limit comparability).
Synthetic analyses based on raw data are frequently
constrained by the ability and willingness of
researchers to share data and expertise. Research
networks and standardized monitoring approaches
provide a framework for data compilation and
sharing while also addressing issues of data
comparability. Forest- and development-focused
research networks, for example, are generating
109Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1399 (2017) 93–115 C© 2017 The Authors. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of New York Academy of Sciences.
Analyzing conservation impacts Mascia et al.
substantive insights on the role of governance in
shaping the effectiveness of interventions (e.g.,
International Forestry Resources and Institutions;
Jameel Poverty Action Lab (www.povertyactionlab.
org)).106
Conclusions
Despite the challenges associated with impact eval-
uation of conservation interventions, key scien-
tific and policy advances are possible through a
3FIGS approach. In recent years, independent con-
siderations of impact-evaluation research designs,
hypotheses from common-pool resource gover-
nance theory, and the SES conceptual frameworks
have provided novel insights into the performance
of MPAs and other conservation interventions. Sci-
entists now have the opportunity to build upon the
strengths of these three approaches to generate fun-
damental insights into how the world works—the
essential basis for evidence-based policy. The con-
servation community will never answer all of its
questions, but greater conceptual clarity and ana-
lytic rigor will allow us to better understand how
MPAs and other interventions shape society and the
world around us.
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